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R INDONESIA’S 
Mortimer ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS?
A graduate in law and journalist now engaged in post­
graduate study at Monash University continues his 
anaylsis of the situation in Indonesia. (For previous article 
see ALR N o. 3, 1966.)
BY D IV ESTIN G  President Sukarno of all status and executive 
power last March, the army-controlled ju n ta  in Indonesia has 
solved its most im m ediate political problem . T h e  long period of 
dual state power has come to an end.
Even so, the ju n ta  was obliged in the end to compromise. 
As far as can be gathered from  the extraordinarily  imprecise 
decision of the Consultative Assembly, Sukarno retains the title, 
b u t none of the rights or powers, of President. At the same time, 
General Suharto has been appointed Acting President! T h e  power­
ful pressures of the students, of General N asution and his sup­
porters, and of the stacked Parliam ent for Sukarno’s ou trigh t 
dismissal and trial were resisted by Suharto, who appreciated the 
delicate political balance in the country could easily be upset by 
too drastic action.
One of the factors that undoubtedly influenced Suharto and 
his advisers was the knowledge that economic discontent in the 
country was growing and  feeding disaffection against a governm ent 
that has by no means established its m andate to  ru le among the 
populace. T h e  Indonesian people have had unpleasant experience 
of m ilitary rule: before, during  and after the regional rebellions 
of 1958, army officers assumed far-reaching powers over the econ­
omy and adm inistration and distinguished themselves m ainly for 
their corruption, repression and arbitrariness. Suharto is by no 
means unaware of the sim m ering cauldron in the provinces; he 
has preserved a civilian gloss to the regime, and has moved slowly 
in curbing the President and his supporters. But ultim ately it may 
well be in the economic sphere that the success or failure of the 
‘New O rder’ will be determ ined.
A t the time of the m ilitary takeover in  O ctober 1965 the 
Indonesian economy was in  a shocking state. T h e  post-indepen- 
dence period was peculiarly devoid of economic rationality . T he
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colonial character of the economy was hardly altered; m ining, oil 
and estate production provided the exports, light industry the 
m anufactures, and peasant agriculture the food supply. No heavy 
or m achine tool industries of any consequence were established; 
but, far worse, the existing productive sectors were allowed to 
stagnate or decline. Light industry, especially textiles, starved of 
raw m aterials and spare parts, declined to 20 per cent or less 
of productive capacity. T h e  rubber, copra, tea and sugar estates 
dw indled in ou tpu t through m ism anagement and, more seriously, 
the failure to carry out the vital replan ting programs on which 
their futures depended. T ranspo rt and communications collapsed, 
exports steadily fell away, while the foreign loans used to cover 
the trade deficit m ounted to the po in t where interest repayments 
alone could not be met. (Foreign indebtedness by the end of 
1965 am ounted to 2,300 m illion US dollars.) T he  swollen bureau­
cracy, totalling some two m illion, including the arm ed forces, 
imposed a crushing burden which state finances were unable to 
support, especially since corruption and inefficiency were rife. (In 
1965 governm ent revenues am ounted to only 1.5 per cent of 
national income, compared w ith 13 per cent in 1960; this was 
due, not to the lightness of taxes, bu t to the fact that they were 
either evaded or appropriated by officials.) Food production fell 
far beh ind the needs of a popu lation  rising by close to three 
m illion a year. T he meagre survival of the country rested upon 
the bent shoulders of the peasant and small export crop producer.
So far the m ain concentration of the Suharto Governm ent in 
the economic sphere has been to reassure and woo the West, to 
placate old creditors and attract new ones. In pursu it of this 
objective, priority has been given to the control of inflation, the 
negotiation of loan deferments and new loans, the re turn  of 
nationalised undertakings to their foreign owners, guaranteees and 
favorable terms for capital investm ent, and promises to  widen the 
scope and ease of the operations of private enterprise. In  this 
direction, the regime has achieved modest successes: inflation has 
slowed down, although in the last quarter of 1966 the retail price 
index still rose by 33 per cent and the money supply by 32 per cent; 
loan repayments have been rescheduled, and small am ounts of 
foreign capital have been forthcoming. Given the interest of the 
W est in sustaining this impeccably anti-communist government, 
we may expect aid to be enlarged so long as the regime shows 
signs of lasting and of m eeting im perialist terms, economic and 
political. However, no am ount of aid sufficient to stim ulate sub­
stantial economic developm ent is feasible, and meanwhile the poli­
tical effectiveness of foreign assistance depends on the perform ance 
not of friends abroad bu t of the m en in power in Indonesia itself.
T h e  key question is w hether the measures being taken will be 
translated into economic developm ent and betterm ent for the
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masses of the people. O n this score, the results to date are negative 
and the prospects dim. Economic activity has slowed down, p a r­
ticularly in industry and trade, including exports. T here  has been 
a m arked increase in  smuggling of goods in to and out of the 
country. (Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, Australian 
N ational University, February 1967.) Inflationary control steps 
have brought added misery to an already sorely tried populace in 
the form of price and tax increases, and harsh credit controls 
which have im poverished the small producers and traders. As 
stated by one of G eneral Suharto’s economic advisers, Dr. Emil 
Salim:
Rates and charges on all public utilities such as electricity, drinking water, 
postal services, train , bus and air fares have been raised twenty times, and 
even petrol prices have been raised eight times . . .  I t has raised unem ploym ent 
and high price problem s. (The Australian, A pril 18, 1967.)
Combined w ith these have gone measures to oust the Chinese 
m inority from their near monopoly of domestic commerce and 
small scale m anufacture. T he  results have been widely disruptive, 
and have resulted in  serious riots in  D jakarta  and  provincial 
towns. Even the conservative Moslem trade union federation and 
the Moslem Students Organisation, both supporters of the govern­
ment, have been driven to protest the price increases. In  centres 
where anti-governm ent sentim ent is strong, seething discontent 
is reported.
Surabaya’s economy, and therefore the economy of the whole of East Java, 
is rapidly coming to a standstill. T he com bination of the political persecution 
of the Chinese com m unity, national as well as foreign, and the G overnm ent’s 
tight money policy, is progressively paralysing trade not only w ith o ther coun­
tries, but w ith neighboring Indonesian islands and regions, Food prices in 
Surabaya have risen 10 per cent in the past two weeks. Interest rates are up  
to 30 per cent. Local factories are closing because of shortages of raw m aterials 
and rising transport costs—the direct restdt of the G overnm ent’s recent increase 
in the price of petrol. (Creighton Burns in The Age, M arch 26, 1967.)
I t m ight be argued that these are bu t the pains of read just­
m ent which will gradually pass as the governm ent puts into effect 
m ore fundam ental economic reforms. T o  accept this argum ent, 
however, one would have to assume two things: first, that there 
is a sufficient reform  spirit w ithin the governm ent leadership to 
want to bring about a basic overhaul of the' economy, and  second, 
that the governm ent will be able to make its will effective in the 
spheres of adm inistration and management. N either of these two 
assumptions appears likely to be borne out. T h a t some members 
of the governm ent aspire to create conditions of stability and 
prosperity may be conceded; the same could equally be said of 
President Sukarno. B ut no m ore than of him  can it be said of 
the new power-holders as a group that they are prepared to take 
the drastic steps necessary to cleanse the m achinery of the state, 
since to do so would be to run  head on against the interests of 
those upon whose support the regim e depends— the civil sefvice
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heads, army adm inistrators, political fixers and speculators, all of 
whom have been battening on Indonesia’s economic corpse and 
m aking fortunes from the pickings.
Certainly the regime has effected some economies. As Dr. 
Salim summarised them, they am ount to a cut-back in expendi­
tures to bare necessities, the abandonm ent of most prestige 
projects, and the cessation of subsidies to State and other enter­
prises. These are m inor reforms in themselves, and no more than 
could be expected of any new adm inistration in 'the first flush of 
its takeover. Sustained results are a different kettle of fish, where 
atten tion  m ust be focused not so much on w hat the governm ent 
claims it will do but on what the social and political structures 
over which it presides will m ake possible.
T h e  first and most essential step towards long term  stability 
would have to be the purification of the bureaucracy, w ithout 
which no reforms can be carried through effectively over a 
sustained period. T he  bureaucrats are in a position to control 
everything that goes on in the economic sphere, from the collection 
of taxes, the d istribution of supplies and the functioning of 
industry to the channelling of such foreign aid as may become 
available. Fifty per cent of this bureaucratic apparatus is redun­
dant, bu t the governm ent would find it politically impossible to 
scale it down to an efficient size — the prestige of higher officials 
depends on the size of their establishments, and complex ties of 
m utual interest bind the State functionaries together in a massive 
self-protection league. Even the student organisations which act 
as agitators for the army have an interest in the m aintenance of 
the bureaucracy, since most students want to become executives 
in State business enterprises, where the biggest incomes are to be 
had. Yet w ithout this purging of the adm inistration, the best-laid 
plans of governm ent are bound to founder in the mass of corrup­
tion which has become a way of life for Indonesia’s officials. T he  
only significant change so far in the composition of the bu reau­
cracy is the replacem ent of civilian officials at various levels with 
army officers, in furtherance of G eneral Suharto’s dictum  that “the 
arm ed forces are faced by the heavy task of becoming the nucleus 
of the New O rder”. On past experience, the only effect of these 
changes will be to enlarge the scale of corruption, since army men 
can operate with far less fear of arrest than can civilians. Relations 
between the m ilitary and civilian elements in the regime are not 
likely to improve as a result.
T o  m ake m atters worse, G eneral Suharto announced on 
M arch 31 that Indonesia’s arm ed forces will be doubled in the 
next ten years, with a substantial increase of 75,000 by the end 
of 1968. No reason was stated for this staggering increase in an 
already inflated m ilitary establishm ent, and strangely enough the
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Australian Governm ent, which in the past was wont to comment 
upon the extravagance of Sukarno's arm ed forces, has been silent 
on the subject. T he  extra financial drain  of this expansion will 
alone be enormous; the salaries of civilian and army officials 
already swallow almost half of routine expenditures, m aking it 
more than doubtful th a t the regime will achieve its aim of a 
balanced budget this year. But of even greater consequence will 
be the added im petus given to m ilitary intrusions into the econ­
omic and political life of the nation.
It was stated earlier that small scale production by peasants 
jn d  growers of export crops has kept that economy functioning 
.n some m anner. T o  m ain tain  and accelerate their contribution, 
the governm ent would have to create suitable conditions of 
fccurity and incentive. So far as the peasants are concerned, this 
<v>ould involve land reform , relief of debts, price stability and 
Technical aid. T here  is considerable room for agricu ltu ral expan­
sion in Indonesia, but the precarious position of the small-holder 
reinforces his conservatism and inhibits innovation. T h e  Sukarno 
regime tinkered with land reform and drew up am bitious plans 
lor technical im provem ent, bu t these were never carried through 
in the face of the resistance of wealthy rura l interests and the 
disinterest of the u rban  elite. T he  new governm ent is even less 
likely to tackle the problem , since it is considerably m ore depen­
dent on the political goodwill of the landow ning class than its 
predecessor. N or has it come to the assistance of the small export 
crop producers. On the contrary, its credit restrictions have hit 
this group hardest, and the measures taken against Chinese m er­
chants have upset the traditional channels of small scale production 
and trade. T he  Chinese alone have the connections overseas and 
the knowledge of external markets to act as the prim ing force 
of this basic production; and now, under the weight of persecution, 
they are not supplying the credit which is the lifeblood of small 
scale production and trade.
In  summary, then, the alignm ent of class forces in Indonesia 
is inimical to economic stability and development. T h e  power 
apparatus in the country serves, not as a lever of im provem ent, 
b u t as the m ajor obstacle. In  these circumstances, W estern aid 
is more likely to prom ote Latin American patterns of instability 
than to pu t the economy on its feet. Failing a breach in the 
ruling coalition and the emergence of some genuine reform ing 
m ovement from w ith in  the establishment, the short-term  trend 
is almost certain to be towards m ore exacting demands on the 
populace, greater degeneration of the state apparatus, and more 
stringent m ilitary repression to suppress the symptoms of mass 
discontent.
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